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Abstract In political science the economic left–right dimension plays a central role. A
growing body of evidence shows that the economic policy preferences of a large segment
of citizens do not scale sufficiently. Using Mokken scale analysis, this study determines the
causes of this phenomenon. Differences in the extent to which the economic policy
preferences of citizens fit the left–right dimension can be explained in terms of the
interaction between individual level and political system-level variables: citizens who
spend more attention to politicians with views that conform to the left–right dimension,
have views that conform to the left–right dimension. There is also a role for the legacy of
communist dictatorship: citizens who were socialised in democratic countries have views
that fit the left–right dimension better than those socialised during communism.
Keywords Economic issues  Public opinion  Elite-mass linkage  Socialisation  Left–
right dimension
1 Introduction
The economic left–right dimension plays a central role in models of political behaviour and
democratic representation (Costello et al. 2012; Downs 1957; Kriesi et al. 2008; Mair
2007; Thomassen 1999). The central idea is that citizens who favour a more egalitarian
distribution of income also favour more government intervention in the economy. A
growing body of evidence suggests that citizens’ economic policy preferences cannot be
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summarised in terms of a single left–right dimension. For one, citizens’ opinions on the
welfare state are often ideologically inconsistent and contradictory (Achterberg et al. 2011;
Derks 2004, 2006; De Koster et al. 2013; Goerres and Prinzen 2011; Roosma et al. 2012;
Roosma et al. 2014). Other research has shown that economic interventionism and egal-
itarianism (Otjes 2014) or support for equal opportunities and equal outcomes (Fossati and
Ha¨usermann 2014) do not constitute a single dimension. A number of studies have noted
that citizens’ views on economic issues do not cohere, but these studies have treated this as
a methodological or a case-specific issue (e.g. Costello et al. 2012; Dolezal et al. 2013;
Sperber 2010; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012; Walczak et al. 2012). It appears that citizens’
opinions on economic issues deviate from the left–right dimension that plays such a crucial
role in models of political behaviour and democratic representation.
This phenomenon merits better understanding, so this article will address two closely
related questions. First this article will analyse whether the economic policy preferences of
European citizens can be summarised in a single left–right dimension. In this sense, this
study echoes the classic study by Converse (1964), which found that citizens in general do
not have policy positions that fit the left–right dimension. But this study will delve further
into this phenomenon by examining its causes, by asking under what conditions citizens
have economic policy preferences that do not fit the economic left–right dimension. Here
the article builds on classic work on political socialisation (Key 1961; Neundorf 2009;
Zaller 1992) by arguing that the structure of voter preferences is the result of an interaction
between the political system and the individual voters. On the one hand, polity-level
characteristics, such as a history of communism and the structure of elite competition,
shape voters’ preferences. On the other hand, only voters raised under communism are
affected by its legacy, and only voters who pay attention to politics are likely to be affected
by what political elites do. By showing that there are meaningful differences between
regions and groups of voters in the extent to which citizens’ views fit the left–right
dimension, this article lends credence to the idea that this phenomenon is not some kind of
measurement error, but reflects meaningful differences between citizens.
This article has the following structure. First, this article will describe the academic
debate about the value of the left–right dimension for understanding voters’ economic
preferences. Then this article will offer a number of explanations for why voters’ views on
economic issues may not fit the economic left–right dimension. Next, this article will
discuss how those explanations were tested. Mokken scaling analysis (Mokken 1971) was
used to explore the coherence of citizens’ economic preferences. This article first looks at
aggregate scaling results to determine whether citizens’ views on economic issues col-
lectively can be considered as a single economic left–right scale; then it looks at indi-
vidual-level results, using a measure of person-fit as the dependent variable. This measure,
known as Guttman errors (Meijer 1994), expresses the extent to which individual citizens’
answering patterns fit the tested model. Finally, the relevance of the results for future
research will be discussed.
2 The Economic Left–Right Dimension and Challenges to This Dimension
The left–right dimension plays a central role in theoretical and empirical studies of
democratic politics (Mair 2007; Thomassen 1999). The economic left–right dimension is
thought of as the centrepiece of a left–right ‘super-issue’ that also orders citizens’ views on
environmental and ethical issues (Inglehart 1984). The extent to which the left–right
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dimension suffices to understand voters’ positions is a matter of lively debate (Evans et al.
1996; Kriesi et al. 2008; Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009).
What has been contested far less is the notion that there is a single economic dimension,
that structures citizens’ opinions on economic issues. This concerns at least two issues:
economic interventionism and economic egalitarianism. First is the classic Downsian
question: ‘[h]ow much government intervention in the economy should there be?’ (Downs
1957, p. 116). Right-wing voters tend to support laissez-faire economic principles, while left-
wing voters tend to support an active government. Economic egalitarianism is the second
element. Lipset et al. (1954, p. 1135) proposed that egalitarianism is the core of the left–right
dimension: ‘[b]y left we shall mean advocating social change in the direction of greater
equality—political, economic or social; by right we shall mean (…) opposing change towards
greater equality’. The right believes that inequalities reward good performance, while the left
favours a more equal redistribution of resources. In Bobbio’s (1996) influential model, the
division between equality and inequality forms the core of the difference between left and
right. Noe¨ll and The´rien (2008) posited that the right and the left have different conceptions of
equality: the left favours equal outcomes and the right favours equal opportunities.
As mentioned above, there is growing evidence that citizens do not think about eco-
nomic matters in these dichotomous terms. The first line of evidence comes from studies of
opinions on the welfare state. Achterberg et al. (2011, p. 1) observed that ‘the international
research literature generally understands economic egalitarianism, the traditional leftist
quest for economic equality and redistributive policies and support for the welfare state as
two closely related phenomena that can be measured by highly interchangeable scales’. A
number of quantitative studies have shown that this is not the case (Achterberg et al. 2011;
De Koster et al. 2013; Derks 2004, 2006; Roosma et al. 2012, 2014). Thus, supporting the
principle of egalitarianism is not the same as supporting the welfare state.1 Goerres and
Prinzen (2011) used focus groups to examine the items traditionally used to measure
citizens’ positions about welfare state policies. They, too, found that citizens’ preferences
were not ideologically consistent.
A number of political science studies have examined the extent to which voters’ views
fit the left–right dimension from a theoretical perspective. Otjes (2014) established that
economic egalitarianism and economic interventionism, the two core elements of the left–
right dimension, are not necessarily the same. Fossati and Ha¨usermann (2014) found that
support for equal opportunities and equal outcomes are not opposing positions on the same
dimension, as Noe¨ll and The´rien (2008) proposed, but rather support for equal opportu-
nities and equal outcomes represent two independent dimensions. These studies were the
first to look at this phenomenon as a theoretical challenge to the prevalence of the left–right
dimension in political science. Other studies have observed the failure of economic left–
right scales but treated it as a methodological or case-specific issue (e.g. Costello et al.
2012; Sperber 2010; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012; Walczak et al. 2012).
Some students of public opinion may not be surprised that citizens’ views on economic
matters do not reflect the left–right dimension. Converse (1964, p. 245) already observed
that in the United States ‘a large proportion of an electorate simply does not have
meaningful beliefs’, not even about those questions that have been heavily debated in the
1 De Koster et al. (2013) and Van der Waal et al. (2010) also examined welfare chauvinism: voters who
tend to be egalitarian do not necessarily support redistribution to immigrant groups. This is part of the new
cultural dimension that Kriesi et al. (2008) argued does not play a role in the economic realm. The goal is to
assess the strength of the economic left–right dimension and not to assess whether the cultural dimension
also structures some aspects of economic preference.
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political and public spheres. The lack of fit to the left–right dimension has been observed in
other countries as well (Butler and Stokes 1974; Dolezal et al. 2013). Zaller (1992, p. 93)
argued that citizens do not have ‘true attitudes’ but rather express ideologically incon-
sistent views under different conditions. This study re-examines these findings and delves
further into the causes of this phenomenon.
3 Why Citizens’ Views on Economic Matters May Deviate
from the Left–Right Dimension
The section above sketched the debate about the extent to which voters’ views on eco-
nomic matters are actually structured by the left–right dimension. This section will offer a
number of explanations for why voters’ views may deviate from a left–right pattern,
building on the classic work in the field of political socialisation (Key 1961; Zaller 1992).
The explanations focus on the interaction between characteristics of individual voters and
their political context.
3.1 The Political Debate in Democratic Systems
Elite-level and mass-level political spaces are not necessarily identical (Van der Brug and
Van Spanje 2009). Still, the structure of party competition may be an important deter-
minant of citizens’ economic policy positions: people take cues from politicians about how
to think about political issues (Key 1961; Neundorf 2009).
For this mechanism to work, two conditions must be met. First, voters should pay
attention to politics. Second, the cues that politicians give should reflect the left–right
dimension. A large proportion of voters does not pay attention to political debates about
economic issues (Bartels 2008). The political elite is unlikely to shape the views of those
who are not interested in politics, as they do not pay enough attention to the political debate
to be influenced by it (Luskin 1990). Citizens are more likely to understand political issues
in the terms of the political elite when those citizens listen to what politicians have to say.
Second, the nature of elite cues matters. If politicians talk in terms of a single left–right
dimension, citizens are more likely to think in those terms (Neundorf 2009). If politicians
express preferences that are less consistent with the left–right dimension, citizens are likely
to develop economic policy positions that also do not fit the left–right dimension. The
nature of party competition shapes the extent to which voters’ views fit the left–right
dimension. Combined, the expectations for voter-level political interest and elite-level cues
lead to the following hypothesis:
1. Democratic Debate Hypothesis: the economic policy preferences of politically
interested citizens in political systems where politicians have economic policy
preferences that fit the left–right dimension are more likely to fit the left–right
dimension than the economic policy preferences of politically disinterested citizens in
those political systems.
3.2 The Legacy of Authoritarian Systems
The Democratic Debate Hypothesis depends on the actual existence of elite conflict. In a
dictatorship, where there is no elite conflict, citizens do not learn to think in opposing
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political terms (Mondak and Gearing 1998). While democratic political systems have been
firmly established in Western Europe for many decades, new democracies were formed in
Central and Eastern Europe only in the early 1990s, after decades of communist rule.
Mondak and Gearing (1998) showed that the experience of dictatorship in Central and
Eastern Europe alienated citizens from politics: people who were socialised during the
dictatorship are less interested in politics and less likely to understand economic interests
in political terms than their counterparts from Western democracies. The underlying
mechanism is socialisation: voters are socialised to think in terms of the elite. If there is no
elite conflict, citizens are not socialised to think in left–right terms about policy issues.
But this is not just a regional difference; it is a generational difference within these post-
communist systems. Only older citizens in those systems are likely to be affected by the
legacy of dictatorship. Citizens who were socialised after their countries democratised are
more likely to have economic policy preferences that correspond to the economic left–right
dimension than citizens who were socialised during the communist dictatorship. This
expectation can be summarised in the following hypothesis.
2. Authoritarian Legacy Hypothesis: the economic policy preferences of citizens who
were more recently socialised in former dictatorships are more likely to fit the left–
right dimension than the economic policy preferences of citizens who were socialised
earlier in those countries.
4 Methodology
This section concerns the methodological approach of this article. First, it will discuss the
chosen scaling method (Mokken scaling). Second, it will discuss the dependent variable of
this study, Guttman errors, which reflect the extent to which a voter’s view fits a Mokken
scale. Third, it will discuss the independent variables in the study. The 2014 European
Election Survey is analysed (Schmitt et al. 2015), which had at least 1000 respondents in
every member state of the European Union in 2014 (except for Malta and Luxembourg,
where the sample size was at least 500). The total response rate was 65% (TNS 2015). In
total, there are 30,064 cases in the data set. Due to missing variables, this was reduced to
22,876 in the analysis.
4.1 Mokken Scaling
This article uses Mokken scaling to test the extent to which voters’ opinions fit the left–
right dimension (Mokken 1971), because it is a simple and intuitive measure of respondent
fit. It allows one to differentiate between citizens whose opinions about economic matters
fit the left–right dimension to a greater or lesser extent.
Mokken scaling was developed to assess the quality of educational tests (Mokken
1971). It tests the assumption that a set of items can be ordered on a continuum from
simplest to most difficult: that is, items for which the largest number of respondents gave
the correct answer to those for which the fewest gave the correct answer.
Since this article uses eleven-step items concerning economic statements instead of
binary data, polytomous Mokken scaling is used (Van der Ark 2007). This scaling method
assesses the extent to which the item steps (instead of items) can be ordered, from those to
which most respondents tended to give left-wing answers to those to which most respondents
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tended to give right-wing answers. If these item steps cannot be ordered as such, this
indicates that citizens’ views on these issues do not follow a left–right pattern. Mokken
scaling cannot handle missing values, so cases with missing values were deleted list-wise.
Alternatives such as Cronbach’s a are based on a number of assumptions about the data, for
instance that voter positions follow a normal distribution (Van Schuur and Kiers 1994). In
contrast, Mokken scaling makes minimal assumptions about data distribution.
Mokken scaling is closely related to the Guttman scale; it is a non-parametric, proba-
bilistic version of this scale (Van Schuur 2003). A key concept in understanding Mokken
scales is Guttman errors. This is the number of item steps that respondents that answer the
‘difficult’ items correctly (or the most right-wing items affirmatively) answer the easy
items incorrectly (or the fewest right-wing items negatively). The Guttman error for







Here I is the total number of item steps, and i and j are item steps that are ordered from
‘easy’ to ‘difficult’. fij can either be zero, if the ordered pattern is not violated, or one if it
is. These violations are weighted by wij, the number of previously missed item steps
(Zijlstra et al. 2007, pp. 7–8).2
One can aggregate the number of Guttman errors made by all respondents in the H-
value. This compares the number of Guttman errors to a pattern where the items are
independent of each other (Mokken 1971). H-values can also be calculated for specific
items (the Hi-values) and the relationship between pairs of items (the Hij-values). The
formulae for polytomous H-, Hi- and Hij-values are listed below.























K is the number of respondents. Fij is the expected number of weighted errors in case of
statistical independence (Van der Schuur 2003, pp. 148–149, 155). If there are no errors, H
equals one; if the error pattern is the same as the pattern for two statistically independent
variables, H equals zero. There is a simple rule of thumb to assess scale quality: a scale of
items that scores lower than 0.3 should not be used as a scale (Mokken 1971).
To show that the results of these analyses are not the result of the particularity of one
method, this article will also report the Cronbach’s a, a standard psychometric test of the
internal consistency of items from the Classical Test Theory family (Cronbach 1951). The
threshold level of a for sufficient consistency is 0.7.
2 Because of these weights, the number of Guttman errors can be quite high (the maximum in this analysis
is 140) as stronger deviations from the expected pattern lead to increasingly high Guttman errors.
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4.2 Dependent Variable and Method of Analysis
Guttman errors will be used as a measure of person-fit (Meijer 1994). They express the
extent to which an individual’s responses fit on the scale. They will be used as dependent
variable in this study. Guttman errors are calculated for a scale with three economic items
which are listed in ‘‘Appendix 1’’: an item touching on income redistribution, an item
touching on economic interventionism and an item touching on the trade-off between taxes
and public services.3
Guttman errors are count data. Count data should not be modelled with ordinary least
squared regression, because the distribution is not normal and is discrete rather than
continuous. For count data, Hilbe (2001) advised using either Poisson regression or neg-
ative binomial regression, depending on whether the data is overdispersed. Since the data is
overdispersed (even the standard deviation is greater than the mean), negative binomial
regression is used to model the number of Guttman errors. Because system-level variables
were included, standard errors are clustered at the country level. Stata is employed to
estimate the negative binomial regression with clustered standard errors and to calculate
expected values.
4.3 Independent Variables
To test the hypotheses, a number of independent variables were included. For the
Authoritarian Legacy Hypothesis, citizens from former communist countries4 were given
the value of one and respondents’ years of birth were used to assess the generational
differences in the legacy of communist dictatorship.5 For reasons of interpretation, the
highest value (the most recent date of birth) is one and the lowest value (the least recent
date of birth) is zero. It is important to note that the interpretation of the year of birth
variable is not straightforward: in a survey with only one wave, it is impossible to
determine differences between age and cohort effects (Mason et al. 1973). If older
respondents from Central and Eastern Europe make more Mokken errors than younger
respondents from that region, this may be the result of a cohort effect, namely that these
older respondents had different experiences in their youth than younger generations did. It
may also result from an age effect, in that these respondents’ views on economic matters fit
the left–right dimension more poorly as they grow older. One can only determine whether
the citizens who were socialised during the communist period differ from those who were
not; one cannot determine whether it is the combination of their year of birth and their
region that causes this effect or the combination of their cohort and their region.
For the measurement of political interest, part of the Democratic Debate Hypothesis,
two questions about political interest were used: whether citizens self-identify as politically
3 Costello et al. (2012) found a similar lack of conformity to the economic left–right dimension using the
2009 European Election Survey, but partially blamed the deviations from the left–right dimension on poor
item wording. In 2014, the items of this survey were worded differently. The items did not ask about
agreement with particular statements, but rather about citizens taking a position on particular dimensions
between extremes (such as completely favouring or opposing state intervention). Therefore, these items do
not suffer from acquiescence bias, which Costello et al. (2012) used to explain why citizens’ policy positions
on economic issues deviated from the left–right dimension.
4 These are Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania,
Slovakia, Slovenia and the six new German Bundesla¨nder.
5 The possibility of a non-linear relationship was examined by adding a quadratic term for year of birth.
This did not substantially alter the results.
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interested and whether they talk about politics in their personal lives. These two items form
a sufficiently strong scale (H = 0.53, Pearson’s r = 0.45). The scale was calculated so that
the maximum is one and the minimum is zero.
This hypothesis also requires a measure of the extent to which the views of politicians in
different countries fit the left–right dimension. To ensure that the effect is truly causal, data
is necessary that predates the 2014 European Election Survey. Therefore the 2009 Euro-
pean Candidate Survey is employed. It queried 1576 candidate MEPs who ran for the 2009
European Parliament from 27 member states (Weßels 2011). The survey included four
economic items, which are listed in ‘‘Appendix 2’’. The scalability of these items was
calculated in general (Table 3) and per country (Table 4). The results are discussed in
detail in Sect. 5. For easier comparison in the regression, the elite-level H-values is
recalculated for this analysis so that the maximum was zero and the minimum was one.
Note that the items on the 2009 survey are different from the items on the 2014 European
Election Survey. This can be to the advantage of this study: rather than considering respondents’
answers on the exact same items, the measure of elite ideological consistency uses different
items. If there still is a significant relationship between the number of Guttman errors politicians
make and the number of Guttman errors respondents make, this indicates that voters’ views on
these issues in general are affected by the way politicians talk about economic issues in general
and not just the positions of the specific issues included in the survey. Moreover, the data clearly
predates the voter-level data, allowing for a clearer grasp of the causal direction.
Three control variables were included in the analysis: education, class and political
knowledge. As Key (1961, p. 304) argued, education in particular may ‘serve to indoc-
trinate people into the more-or-less official political values of the culture’. For the edu-
cation variable, people who left school after the age of 20, or were still studying and older
than 20, were considered to have received higher education. This is the only education-
related variable in the European Election Survey. Social-economic status self-identification
was used for the class variable which, according to Van der Waal et al. (2010), correlates
with conformity to the left–right dimension. A distinction was made between working-
class (including upper working class) and non-working-class voters. To measure respon-
dents’ political knowledge, four different political knowledge questions were included in
the survey. If a respondent indicated that they did not know the answer to a question, this
response was treated as an incorrect answer.6 These three items barely meet the require-
ments for a sufficiently strong scale (H = 0.34, a = 0.52).7 The scale was calculated so
that the maximum is one and the minimum is zero. The correlation with political interest is
0.31, which is significant but not particularly strong (Table 1).
5 Do Citizens’ Views on Economic Matters Fit the Left–Right
Dimension?
The first question this study asked in the introduction is whether voters’ positions on
economic issues fit the left–right dimension. To check this, Mokken scaling analyses on
voter-level data (Table 2) were performed: an analysis of these three economic items,
6 Exclusion of the respondents who did not answer the survey results in a decrease of the N of the study by
40%. Moreover, the four knowledge items do not scale in that case (H = 0.17; a = 0.33). The results are
not significantly different if the cases with missing variables are excluded.
7 The low score on the a can be explained by the fact that the items were dichotomous and quite lopsided:
this violates the assumptions of correlation.
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which are generally considered to form a single economic left–right dimension, showed a
poor scalability coefficient (0.11) at the voter level. This means that the relationship
between the different items is practically indistinguishable from a random pattern. As one
can see from the Hij-values, the lack of scalability is not the result of a single poorly
performing item. The value of the Cronbach’s a, also shown in Table 2, is far below the
threshold. All in all, European citizens’ policy positions cannot be reduced to a single
dimension.
In comparison, at the elite level (Table 3), the four included items did form a suffi-
ciently strong scale, both in terms of the H-values and the a-values shown. Each individual
relationship was also sufficiently strong. This all indicates that—as expected—politicians’
preferences on economic matters fit the left–right dimension.
If one examines the voter-level results at the level of the individual country (Table 4),
one can see mostly the same result: the H-values lie between -0.02 and 0.49. In only one
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of dependent and independent variables
Variable Mean Median SD Min. Max. N
Guttman errors 20.19 11 22.63 0 140 25,568
Year of birth 0.42 0.42 0.21 0 1 30,064
Political interest 0.51 0.50 0.27 0 1 29,895
Political knowledge 0.71 0.75 0.27 0 1 30,064
Central and Eastern European 0.41 – – 0 1 30,064
Education 0.37 – – 0 1 30,064
Class 0.41 – – 0 1 29,663
Elite-level H-value 0.43 0.47 0.21 0 1 28,986
SD is standard deviation, Min is minimum, Max is maximum, N is the number of cases
Table 2 Scaling analysis (voter-level)
Variable Interventionism Egalitarianism Taxes vs. services
Egalitarianism 0.17 0.04
Taxes vs. services 0.12
Hi 0.14 0.11 0.08
H 0.11
Cronbach’s a 0.26
Table 3 Scaling Analysis (elite-level)
Variable Private enterprise Public services Interventionism Redistribution
Public services 0.51
Interventionism 0.53 0.32
Redistribution 0.60 0.51 0.45
Hi 0.55 0.45 0.43 0.52
H 0.48
Cronbach’s a 0.77
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country (Sweden) do citizens’ views on economic issues meet the basic requirement for
scalability on both measures. The other 27 countries do not meet both thresholds.8 Where
the values are negative (Greece and Lithuania), citizens who take a left-wing position on
some issue are more likely to have right-wing positions on other issues. The a and H are
very similar (Pearson’s r = 0.98; significant at the 0.01 level).
There is some variance at the elite level. In most countries, elite opinion form suffi-
ciently strong scales both in terms of the H and the a. In Bulgaria, politicians have negative
H and a scores. Politicians in Lithuania, Latvia, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Estonia do not have economic views that can be considered a single dimension. The
Table 4 Scaling analysis per country
Voter-level Elite-level
Country H-value Cronbach’s a H-value Cronbach’s a
Austria 0.18 0.38 0.73 0.89
Belgium 0.13 0.30 0.51 0.77
Bulgaria 0.06 0.14 -0.06 -0.11
Croatia 0.05 0.12 –a –
Cyprus 0.01 0.03 0.41 0.66
Czech Republic 0.05 0.14 0.29 0.57
Denmark 0.32 0.57 0.61 0.82
Estonia 0.06 0.16 0.28 0.57
Finland 0.25 0.49 0.32 0.61
France 0.19 0.39 0.57 0.80
Germany 0.14 0.32 0.67 0.87
Greece -0.00 -0.01 0.51 0.75
Hungary 0.04 0.10 0.28 0.55
Ireland 0.10 0.24 0.68 0.77
Italy 0.13 0.29 0.44 0.72
Latvia 0.03 0.08 0.23 0.50
Lithuania -0.02 -0.06 0.02 0.07
Luxembourg 0.07 0.19 0.58 0.81
Malta 0.16 0.36 0.90 0.94
Netherlands 0.22 0.45 0.49 0.75
Poland 0.08 0.19 0.30 0.58
Portugal 0.10 0.24 0.48 0.70
Romania 0.05 0.12 0.37 0.66
Slovakia 0.12 0.27 0.66 0.85
Slovenia 0.08 0.17 0.08 0.22
Spain 0.07 0.17 0.48 0.75
Sweden 0.48 0.73 0.55 0.79
United Kingdom 0.16 0.35 0.45 0.74
Bolded values have sufficient internal consistency
a Croatia did not hold European Parliament elections in 2009
8 Denmark just exceeds the threshold for the H, but falls just below the threshold for the a.
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elites surveyed from Cyprus, Finland, Poland and Romania meet the threshold level for the
H but not the a. Again, the a and H are similar (Pearson’s r = 0.93; significant at the 0.01
level).
One can also use these country-level results to get a first grasp of the expectations
formulated above. The Democratic Debate Hypothesis proposed that the extent to which
citizens’ views fit the left–right dimension correlates to the extent to which elites’ views fit
the left–right dimension. There is indeed a significant relationship between the extent to
which politicians’ and voters’ preferences fit the left–right dimension using either method
(Pearson’s r = 0.43 for the H-values significant at the 0.05 level and 0.50 for the a’s
significant at 0.01). The Authoritarian Legacy Hypothesis proposed that the economic
views of citizens from former Central and Eastern European countries are less likely to
reflect the left–right dimension than those of citizens from Western European countries are.
At the country level, this expectation appears to be supported: the H and a are significantly
lower in Central and Eastern Europe than in Western Europe.
6 Why Do Citizens’ Views on Economic Matters Deviate
from the Left–Right Dimension?
The country-level results presented above were in line with the expectations. This section
will test the hypothesis with greater rigour, by analysing the number of Guttman errors
citizens make, in a number of negative binomial regressions (see Table 5). Model 1 is a
model without interaction terms. Model 2 only includes an interaction for the respondents’
year of birth and region of residence. Model 3 includes an interaction for a respondent’s
political interest and the extent to which elites think in left–right terms about economic
issues. Model 4 includes both interactions.
Table 5 Explaining Guttman Errors
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 3.04*** (0.14) 3.00*** (0.14) 2.88*** (0.13) 2.84*** (0.14)
Year of birth -0.09 (0.06) 0.02 (0.07) -0.08 (0.06) 0.01 (0.07)
Central and Eastern Europe 0.33*** (0.09) 0.48*** (0.12) 0.33*** (0.09) 0.46*** (0.12)
Year of birth*
Central and Eastern European
– -0.27** (0.11) – -0.24** (0.10)
Political interest -0.07*** (0.03) -0.08** (0.03) 0.25*** (0.08) 0.23*** (0.08)
Candidate-level H-value 0.01 (0.19) 0.01 (0.18) 0.33* (0.19) 0.31 (0.20)
Political interest*
Elite-level H-value
– – -0.62*** (0.17) -0.59*** (0.18)
Education -0.07** (0.03) -0.08** (0.03) -0.07** (0.03) -0.07** (0.03)
Political knowledge -0.13** (0.05) -0.13** (0.05) -0.13** (0.05) -0.13** (0.05)
Class 0.02 (0.02) 0.01 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02)
Pseudo-log likelihood -91,287 -91,281 -91,275 -91,270
Wald Chi squared 48*** 51*** 56*** 58***
N 22,876 22,876 22,876 22,876
Negative binomial regression with standard errors clustered by country
0.1[ *[ 0.05[ **[ 0.01[ ***
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First, the Democratic Debate Hypothesis is tested, which concerns the relationship
between political interest and the extent to which voters and politicians hold policy
positions that fit the left–right dimension. It is comprised of two parts. First, voters must
pay attention to politics to receive cues from political leaders. Second, leaders must express
to voters views that fit the left–right dimension. Citizens who do not pay attention to
politics are less likely to have preferences that match the schemes politicians employ.
Models 1 and 2 show these variables separately. They show that citizens with more
political interest tend to make fewer Guttman errors. Without an interaction, there is no
relationship between the extent to which elite views on economic matters fit the left–right
dimension and the extent to which voters’ views do. Models 3 and 4 include this inter-
action. There is a significant interaction term in both models. An interaction relationship is
best understood through visualisation, such as Fig. 1 (based on Model 4). There is a
negative relationship between the number of errors citizens make and the extent to which
politicians’ economic views fit the left–right model. When politicians’ views fit the left–
right dimension, politically interested citizens make fewer errors: in the systems with the
most consistent politicians, voters who pay the most attention to politics make 43% fewer
errors than those who pay the least attention to politics. When politicians’ views do not fit









Political Interest, Candidate-level H-value









Fig. 1 Political interest, different levels of elite consistency and the number of Guttman errors. Predicted
values for Guttman errors with a 90% confidence interval for different levels of the candidate-level H-value
on the horizontal dimension (which measures the extent to which politicians’ economic policy preferences
correspond to the left–right model) and different levels of political interest (represented by the two lines).
The grey line represents low levels of interest and the black line represents high levels of interest. Generated
with the Stata margins command. Based on Model 5
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the left–right dimension, politically interested citizens make more errors: in the systems
with the least consistent politicians, voters who pay the most attention to politics make
25% more errors than those who pay no attention to politics. This difference is not sig-
nificant. The difference between citizens from countries with the most and the least con-
sistent politicians is significant beyond the halfway point of the political interest scale.
Both these patterns square with the formulated expectation. Voters who pay attention to
politics take cues from their leaders: when leaders cue voters to think in left–right terms,
voters do so. When politicians cue voters with preferences that deviate from the left–right
dimension, voters’ policy positions also deviate from this dimension.
Second, the Authoritarian Legacy Hypothesis was tested. It posited an interaction
relationship between the legacy of communism and year of birth. In Models 1 and 3,
respondents’ years of birth and regions are included separately. This shows that year of
birth as such is not related to the number of errors made. There is a marked difference
between the two regions: West European citizens are more consistent on economic issues
than citizens from Central and Eastern Europe are.
Models 2 and 4 include an interaction relationship, and the interaction term is significant
in both models. This relationship is visualised in Fig. 2 (based on Model 4). It shows that
the largest difference in the number of errors made by respondents from Western Europe
compared to Central and Eastern Europe is among older people: the oldest citizens from
Central and Eastern Europe made 58% more Guttman errors than their Western European


















Fig. 2 Year of birth, region and the number of Guttman errors. Predicted values for Guttman errors with a
90% confidence interval for different years of birth on the horizontal dimension and different regions
(represented by the two lines). Generated with the Stata margins command. The grey line represents Central
and Eastern Europe and the black line represents Western Europe. Based on Model 5
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contemporaries. There is still a significant difference among the youngest groups, but this
has declined to 25%. This shows that there is a significant and sizeable difference between
countries with and without a legacy of communism in the extent to which citizens’ views
on economic matters fit the left–right dimension.
The Authoritarian Legacy Hypothesis proposed that there is an interaction relationship
between the history of communism and year of birth. There is a 25% difference in the
number of errors between the oldest and youngest voters in Central and Eastern Europe,
compared to a 1% difference in Western Europe (not significant). As hypothesised, the
economic preferences of citizens who were socialised during the communist dictatorships
deviate more from the left–right dimension than the views of citizens who were socialised
in the post-communist period.
The coefficients for the control variables are nearly identical in every analysis. Edu-
cation and political knowledge have significant effects on the number of Guttman errors
respondents make, but class does not.
All in all, the data supports both hypotheses about the causes of conformity to the left–
right dimension. First, political interest contributes to fewer errors in systems where
politicians have preferences that fit the left–right dimension, but to more errors in systems
where politicians deviate from the left–right dimension. Second, there is a difference
between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe in the effect of year of birth on
the number of errors. These results show that one cannot just say that citizens have
heterogeneous preferences.
7 Conclusion
This study adds to a growing number of studies that cast doubt on the extent to which
citizens’ views can be reduced to a single left–right dimension (Achterberg et al. 2011;
Costello et al. 2012; De Koster et al. 2013; Derks 2004, 2006; Dolezal et al. 2013; Goerres
and Prinzen 2011; Fossati and Ha¨usermann 2014; Otjes 2014; Roosma et al. 2012, 2014;
Sperber 2010; Wagner and Kritzinger 2012; Walczak et al. 2012). This study shows that
the policy preferences of citizens from all over the European Union on the economic items
included in the European Election Survey do not follow a unidimensional left–right pat-
tern. This includes items that touches on economic egalitarianism, the core of the left–right
dimension, according to Lipset et al. (1954), and items that touch on economic interven-
tionism, which, according to Downs (1957), is a key element of the left–right dimension.
Sufficient proof for a single economic left–right dimension among voters was found in only
one of the 28 countries examined (Sweden). The results indicate that using the items
studied here, a large proportion of European citizens does not have economic policy
preferences that fit the standard left–right model.
The extent to which citizens’ views fit the left–right dimension was not just measure-
ment error; it reflected differences between countries with different historical experiences
and patterns of party competition and individuals from different generations and with
different levels of political interest. How citizens think about economic policies reflects
how politicians talk about economic policies: citizens who pay more attention to politicians
whose preferences fit better to the left–right dimension tend to have policy positions that fit
this dimension better. The history of communism is also reflected in the data: the pref-
erences of those who were socialised under communist dictatorships in Central and Eastern
Europe deviate the most from the economic left–right dimension. The opinions of the
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younger generations in Central and Eastern European fit the economic left–right dimension
better than those of their elders.
This was a first attempt to delve into the extent to which voters’ opinions fit the
economic left–right dimension. There may be other causes not included in this study. For
instance, objective economic circumstances (e.g. unemployment) or the subjective expe-
rience of not feeling fairly treated may be more important indicators of non-conforming
policy positions on economic issues (Bartels 2008). This article explained differences
between Central and Eastern Europe and Western Europe by referring to the effect of
alienation from politics on economic preferences in general. Perhaps the different rela-
tionship between political trust and economic interventionism differs between the Western
Europe and in Central and Eastern Europe, due to different experiences with totalitarian
dictatorships. A different research design would be necessary to test this relationship, one
that would explain the support for interventionism as a function of the interaction between
egalitarianism and political trust.
Future research may also want to delve into the effects of the fact that citizens’ views do
not fit the left–right dimension but politicians’ views do, on democratic representation. If
citizens’ preferences cannot be reduced to a single dimension but politicians’ views can,
this implies a major challenge for representation (Van der Brug and Van Spanje 2009). In a
representative democracy, elections function as instruments to link citizens’ policy pref-
erences to the policy positions of their representatives. For this mechanism to function, a
common policy dimension must structure the positions of parties and voters (Thomassen
1999). If parties only offer left-wing and right-wing policy packages but a large group of
citizens want lower taxes and more government intervention, these citizens cannot find
adequate representation in a party system that offers an either/or choice between these two
options. They may feel unrepresented and therefore alienated from politics, undermining
political trust.
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Appendix 1
See Table 5.
Table 5 Included items (voter level)
Item Question Type Options
Interventionism Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues.
For each issue, we will present you with two opposite
statements and we will ask your opinion about these two
statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on
a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means that you ‘‘0: You are
fully in favour of state intervention in the economy’’ and
‘10’ means that you ‘‘10: You are fully opposed to state
intervention in the economy’’. Then if your views are
somewhere in between, you can choose any number that
describes your position best
Scale 11




Table 6 Included items (elite level)
Item Question Type Options
Private
enterprise
Private enterprise is the best way to solve [country’s] economic
problems
Agreement 5
Public services Public services should be in state ownership Agreement 5
Interventionism Politics should abstain from intervening in the economy. Agreement 5




Item Question Type Options
Egalitarianism Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues.
For each issue, we will present you with two opposite
statements and we will ask your opinion about these two
statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on
a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means that you ‘‘0: You are
fully in favour of the redistribution of wealth from the rich to
the poor in [country]’’ and ‘10’ means that you ‘‘10: You are
fully opposed to the redistribution of wealth from the rich to
the poor in [country]’’. Then if your views are somewhere in





Now I would like you to tell me your views on various issues.
For each issue, we will present you with two opposite
statements and we will ask your opinion about these two
statements. We would like to ask you to position yourself on
a scale from 0 to 10, where ‘0’ means that you ‘‘0: You are
fully in favour of raising taxes to increase public services’’
and ‘10’ means that you ‘‘10: You are fully in favour of
cutting public services to cut taxes’’. Then if your views are
somewhere in between, you can choose any number that
describes your position best
Scale 11




When you get together with friends or relatives, how often





Knowledge 1 Switzerland is a member of the EU True/false 2
Knowledge 2 Each member state elects the same number of representatives
to the European Parliament
True/false 2
Knowledge 3 There are [150% of the correct number] members in the [lower
house of the national parliament]
True/false 2
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